

Deanonymisation in Ethereum Using Existing Methods for Bitcoin

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Introduction

- Blockchain
 - Decentralised
 - Peer-to-peer
 - Miners
 - Anonymous reputation
- Forensics
 - Track malicious actors



Introduction

The integrity of the *blockchain*





Figure 1: Overview of how blocks in a blockchain are linked to each other

Introduction

Blockchain popularity

- Bitcoin
 - 2009
 - 'Satoshi Nakamoto'
- Ethereum
 - 2015
 - Vitalik Buterin



Research Question


"Is deanonymisation of clients feasible
for the Ethereum network?"



Related Work

- Survey on Bitcoin security and privacy issues
 - Essential background knowledge
 - Attacks on Bitcoin
 - Bitloline
- Survey on Ethereum smart contracts
 - Aimed at illegitimately obtaining funds
 - DAO attack


Bitcoin



Bitcoin P2P Network

Discovering clients:

- Hardcoded seed servers
- Clients maintain 8 entry-nodes
- `getaddr` message



Transaction propagation:

- Trickleing
 - Queueing `inv` messages
 - 100ms


Bitcoin Blockchain

Transactions

- Based on UTXO
- Use up all inputs
- Change

Blocks:


- Merkle tree
- Header hash
- Forks



Bitcoin (& Ethereum) Consensus Model

PoW (Proof of Work):

- Based on computational power
- Against Sybil attack




Ethereum




Ethereum Smart Contracts

- Code written for EVM
 - Turing complete
 - Solidity
- Immutable once deployed
- Miners paid in gas - prevent DoS
- Crowd funding



Ethereum P2P Network

- Kademlia based
- Bootnodes
- Find nodes
 - `nodeID` from public key
 - Closeness
 - XOR of SHA-3 hash




Ethereum Blockchain

Transactions:

- No UTXO
- Account balance

Blocks:

- Global state
- Transaction *trie*
- Ommers



Attacks



Existing Attacks - Finding IP Addresses




Figure 2: Entry-nodes in Bitcoin

- Identifying entry-nodes
 - Monitor 'server' nodes
 - Listen for `addr` messages
- Monitor network
- Transaction broadcasts
- Very resource intensive


Effectiveness - Finding IP Addresses

- Peers of a node more volatile
- No set number of peers




Existing Attacks - Clustering

- Crawler
- Multi-input transactions
- Transaction 'change'



Effectiveness - Clustering

- No multi input
- No change
- No shadow addresses



Discussion & Conclusion

*"Is deanonymisation of clients feasible
for the Ethereum network?"*

Deanonymisation attacks difficult to apply:

- Finding IP
 - Nodes not static
- Clustering
 - No multiple addresses

But, possibilities for similar attacks

Future Work

- **Bootnodes**
 - Shadow network
 - Government
- **Peer selection protocol**
 - Create nodes
 - Identify nodes
- **Attack wallet software**
 - Less resource intensive

References

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Questions

