# How to Spot the Blue Team?

#### Red Team Infrastructure Security

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Research Project 2

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
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### Outline

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#### Introduction

- Red Teaming vs Blue Teaming
- Team Goals



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### Project Goal

- Find a way to detect blue team **actions** so that the red team can stay undetected and achieve long-term engagement.
- Project is **not** about how to stay undetected as a Red Team

### Research Question

- How to secure a red team infrastructure to detect a blue team analysis?
  - How does a red team infrastructure look like?
  - 2 How can a blue team analysis be detected?

#### Related Work

- No related work regarding detecting a blue team analysis
- Some related work regarding how a red team operation and infrastructure looks:
  - Wiki to collect Red Team infrastructure hardening resources[Dimmock]
  - Cobalt Strike Red Team Operations Course and Notes[cob, 2013]
  - Powershell Empire Documentation[pow]

### Method

- Literature Study and interviews to figure out how a typical red team infrastructure look like
- Analysis of a red team operation software to know how an operation looks like
  - Cobalt Strike
  - PowerShell Empire
- If you know what a Remote Access Tool's request looks like, you know what legit traffic/events are, and what not

### Red Team Infrastructure




Figure: Red Team Infrastructure

# Red Team Infrastructure Security

#### Desired Security Controls

- Preventive Security Controls (Limited)
  - Firewall
  - System Hardening
  - Concealment
- Detective Security Controls
  - Logging and Monitoring
  - IDS
- Responsive Security Controls
  - Disposing/New Infrastructure
  - Distraction/Decoy

## **Proof of Concept**

#### Requirements:

- Able to detect a Blue Team's analysis of a Red Team's operation
- Usable for multiple Red Team operations
- Should not trigger by random Internet scans

### Infrastructure




Figure: Proof of Concept Basic Red Team Infrastructure

### Red Team Software Analysis

- Focused on successful callback and communication from target
- HTTP/(S) Requests for communication (or other protocols)
- DNS Domain Lookups

# How to Spot the Blue Team?

# HTTP(S) Communication Paths

#### Command and Control Communication Paths:

- "/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/with/get.php"
- "/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/with/news.php"
- "/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/with/login/process.php"

#### Blue Team:

- "/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/with/"
- "/legit/communication/uri/to"

#### Anomaly:

- No fully complete Command and Control communication path
- Contains first prefix ("/legit/\*")

### **User-Agents**

#### Command and Control User-Agent:

"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko"

#### Blue Team:

 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.36"

#### Anomaly:

 Different User-Agent compared to the Command and Control User-Agent

#### **GEO** Location

#### Target Location:

Country: Netherlands

#### Blue Team:

Country: Russia

#### Anomaly:

• Command and Control traffic from unexpected location

## DNS Domain Lookup

#### Command and Control Lookup:

• "rt-1.very.legit.domain.tours.prac.os3.nl"

#### Blue Team:

- "domain.tours.prac.os3.nl"
- "very.legit.domain.tours.prac.os3.nl"

### Anomaly:

Any other sub-domain lookup

#### Virustotal

#### Command and Control Beacon/Payload:

Known Hash


#### Blue Team:

Upload to Virustotal

#### Anomaly:

 When hash is known by Virustotal while the Red Team uses unique files

### Logging Infrastructure



# Proof of Concept Advantages and Disadvantages

#### Advantages:

- API
- Good for logging data

#### Disadvantages:

- Complex
- Not good for events/alerts (nor with other alternatives)
- Hard to find needed data (especially with multiple Red Team operations)

Better alternatives?

# Usage: query.py [options]

```
ricklahaye@Sioux-Falls:~/red-team-infrastructure-security/python$ ./query.py --help
Usage: query.py [options]
Options:
  -h. --help
                        show this help message and exit
 --host=HOST
                        host [10.0.0.1]
  --port=PORT
                        port [9200]
 --paths=PATH
                        C2 paths [/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/get
                        .php./legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/news.php
                        //legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/login/proces
                        s.php1
  --user agent=USER AGENT
                        C2 user agent [Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64;
                        Trident/7.0: rv:11.0) like Geckol
  --index=INDEX
                        index [packetbeat-*]
  --geo-country=GEO
                        country [Netherlands]
  --dns=DNS
                        dns host name
                        [rt-1.very.legit.domain.tours.prac.os3.nl]
  --dns-prefix=DNS PREFIX
                        dns host name prefix root [*domain.tours.prac.os3.nl]
 cklahaye@Sioux-Falls:~/red-team-infrastructure-security/python$
```

Figure: query.py options

### query.py output

```
icklahaye@Sioux-Falls:~/red-team-infrastructure-security/python$ ./query.py
<bound method Elasticsearch.info of <Elasticsearch([{'host': '10.0.0.1'. 'port': '9200'}])>>
 User Agent
 Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
 Paths: ['/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/get.php', '/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/
news.php', '/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/login/process.php'l
 Status: 6 anomalies
 Geo Location
 Geo Country: Netherlands
 Paths: ['/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/get.php', '/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/
news.php', '/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/login/process.php'l
 Status: No anomalies
 Virustotal
 Status: 9 anomalies
 Communication Paths
 Paths: ['/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/get.php', '/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/
news.php', '/legit/communication/uri/to/filter/width/login/process.php'l
 Status: 42 anomalies
 DNS: rt-1.very.legit.domain.tours.prac.os3.nl
 DNS Prefix: *domain.tours.prac.os3.nl
 Status: 41 anomalies
  cklahaye@Sioux-Falls:~/red-team-infrastructure-security/python$
```

Figure: query.py output

#### Conclusion

- Typical Red Team infrastructure uses redirectors and Command and Control servers that are disposable and automated
- Detecting the Blue Team requires knowledge of own Red Team's operation and its used tools
- Detecting the Blue Team can be done with a monitoring and logging infrastructure
- No good tooling is available to detect the Blue Team

#### Future Work

- Build free and working plugin for Kibana for alerting
- Improve the Python script's output
- Create a tooling that is able to learn a Red Team operation
- Many others..

### Questions

Are there any questions?

#### References

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